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IT'S NOT RAPE-RAPE:
STATUTORY RAPE CLASSIFICATION
UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL
ACT
NORAH M. ROTHt
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, film director Roman Polanski plead guilty to
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor-a statutory rape
crime.' The California statute under which Polanski was
convicted makes it a felony for an adult to engage in sexual
intercourse with a person under the age of eighteen.' Despite
actress Whoopi Goldberg's infamous statement "it wasn't rape-
rape,"' the circumstances surrounding Polanski's conviction
suggested a particularly heinous crime. Polanski's thirteen-year-
old victim testified before a grand jury that Polanski gave her
alcohol and drugs before engaging in vaginal and anal
intercourse with her despite her protests.' If Polanski's
conviction were subsequently analyzed for sentence enhancement
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), most courts
would not consider it to be a violent felony. While it may seem to
the casual onlooker that Polanski's specific violation of the
t Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, May 2012, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., Environmental Sciences, 2007, University of
Virginia.
' Grace Lichtenstein, Polanski Guilty Plea Accepted in Sex Case: District
Attorney Says Admission on One Count Will Spare Victim the Trauma of a Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1977, at 14.
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2011). In 1978 this statute applied only to
adults engaging in sexual intercourse with female minors, but it was amended in
1993 to apply to both male and female victims. See id. The statute also provides for
stricter sentencing when the crime is committed by an adult at least twenty-one
years of age against a minor under the age of sixteen. Id.
' Nick Allen, Roman Polanski: Backlash as Whoopi Goldberg Says Director
Didn't Commit 'Rape-Rape', THE TELEGRAPH (U.K), Sept. 30, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/roman-polanskil6245219/Roman-Polanski-
backlash-as-Whoopi-Goldberg-says-director-didnt-commit-rape-rape.html.
4 See Lichtenstein, supra note 1.
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California statute amounted to a violent crime, the same might
not be true for all behaviors criminalized under that same
statute.
The ACCA punishes repeat violent offenders convicted of
being felons in possession of a firearm with a mandatory
minimum fifteen-year sentence.' This sentence enhancement is
based on the defendant having three previous convictions for
violent felonies.6 Federal courts are currently split over whether
statutory rape should be considered a violent felony under the
ACCA. The Second Circuit has answered this question in the
affirmative. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, however,
have declined to classify statutory rape as a violent felony.
Several factors complicate classification of statutory rape
under the ACCA. First, it is a strict liability crime, and the
statutory age of consent varies from state to state. Additionally,
the same statute can often be applied to a range of behaviors.
For instance, a statute that simply criminalizes sexual
intercourse with any person under the age of seventeen would
apply equally to an eighteen-year-old's sexual relationship with
his or her sixteen-year-old partner, and a thirty-year-old's sexual
relationship with a twelve-year-old child.
This Note argues that because statutory rape laws can be
applied to a range of behaviors, some violent and some not,
judges should look to the age of the victim in determining
whether a past conviction qualifies as a violent felony for the
purpose of sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Part I of
this Note examines the legislative history and purpose of the
ACCA and discusses Supreme Court precedent regarding violent
felony classification under the ACCA's residual clause. Part II
provides background on the current circuit split regarding
the classification of statutory rape as a violent felony under
the ACCA. Part III analyzes the application of the ACCA's
residual clause to the crime of statutory rape on the basis of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, legislative purpose, and policy
considerations, and it offers recommendations for a solution that
will best suit the purposes of the ACCA. This Note suggests that
judges should look beyond the fact of a statutory rape conviction
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006)(e)(1).
6 Id.
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to the ages of the victim and perpetrator for the basis of violent
felony classification. This would allow for a determination more
firmly grounded in the reality of the defendant's crime.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ARMED CAREER
CRIMINAL ACT
A. Legislative History
The ACCA was passed in 1984 for the purpose of reducing
crime by enhancing sentences for career criminals.' The statute
created a minimum fifteen-year sentence for criminals with at
least three past convictions for violent felonies who are found
guilty of the federal offense of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. Congress was acting in response to studies that tended
to show that a majority of crimes are perpetrated by a small
number of habitual criminals.' The statute was designed to
incapacitate these habitual criminals by mandating lengthy
sentences for repeat offenders who had proved to be
"unrehabilitative." 0
The ACCA originally applied only to offenders with past
convictions for armed robbery and armed burglary." In 1986,
however, it was amended to apply to those with past convictions
for serious drug offenses and violent felonies as well. Thus, a
much broader class of repeat offenders could be subjected to the
sentence enhancement. 2
Violent felonies are defined in subsection (e)(2)(B) of the
statute as:
[Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an
adult, that-
See 134 CONG. REC. 15807 (1988).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
9 H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661,
1984 WL 37450.
10 See 134 CONG. REC. 15807.
n See id.
12 See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARv. J ON LEGIs. 537, 547
(2009).
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(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]1
The classification provision of crimes that "otherwise
involve [ I conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another"14 is referred to as the statute's
"residual clause."
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Classification Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act's Residual Clause
1. Taylor v. United States and the Categorical Approach
Application of the ACCA's residual clause generally involves
what is known as a "categorical approach." Under this approach,
courts look only to the statutory elements of a crime to determine
whether that crime should be classified as a violent felony for
sentence enhancement purposes.' 5  A narrow exception to the
categorical approach, the "modified categorical approach," is
applied in circumstances where both violent and nonviolent
behaviors can be described under the same criminal statute.e
While still narrow, the range of circumstances to which the
modified approach is applied has been expanded over the last two
decades. This subsection introduces the original development of
the categorical and modified categorical approaches. Changes to
these approaches are discussed further in the sections below
covering recent Supreme Court decisions on classification under
the ACCA.
The categorical approach was first described by the Supreme
Court in Taylor v. United States." Taylor held that "the only
plausible interpretation of [the ACCA] is that . .. it generally
requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and
the statutory definition of the prior offense."'" The Court also
provided that this categorical approach could be modified to
"permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of
" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
14 Id.
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
16 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2010).
1 495 U.S. at 602.
1 Id.
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conviction in a narrow range of cases." 9 Taylor identified the
circumstances subject to this modification as those in which "a
jury was actually required to find all the elements" of a
qualifying offense. 20 The Court went on to provide the example of
conviction under a burglary statute that included burglary of a
building or of a vehicle.21 The Court explained that if a jury
would be required to find burglary of a building to convict the
defendant, burglary of a building would be the crime analyzed
under the ACCA, as opposed to burglary of a building or
vehicle.22
The scope of the modified categorical approach has since
been expanded. In Shepard v. United States, the Court held that
the modified approach could be applied to guilty plea and bench
trial convictions, as well as to jury convictions.2 3 In these cases,
the Court held that courts could examine the "bench-trial judge's
formal rulings of law and findings of fact," or "the statement of
factual basis for the charge."2
2. James v. United States
In the 2007 case James v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that attempted burglary under a Florida statute was a
predicate offense for ACCA sentence enhancement.2 5 The James
court made two important contributions to the analytic
framework for identifying which crimes are covered by the
ACCA's residual clause. First, James clarified the categorical
approach for classification under the residual clause. Second,
James interpreted the amount of risk that needs to be presented
by crimes falling under the residual clause." It is also worth
noting that, in this case, the Supreme Court looked to the United
States Sentencing Commission for guidance on classifying
attempted crimes as violent felonies.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
" See 544 U.S. 13, 19 (2005).
24 Id. at 20.
25 550 U.S. 192, 213-14 (2007).
26 Id. at 207-08.
27 Id. at 206.
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In James, the Supreme Court clarified Taylor's categorical
approach to classification under the residual clause. Taylor's
categorical approach required that courts look to the statutory
elements of a crime, rather than the particular facts surrounding
the perpetration of the crime, in order to determine whether it
fell under the residual clause of the ACCA." The James court
clarified that the appropriate question under the categorical
approach is not whether all instances of the crime presented a
serious risk of injury; rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether
the crime presents such a risk in the "ordinary case."2 9 In other
words, James instructed that a crime falls under the residual
cause when a typical perpetration of the crime presents a serious
potential risk of injury to another person. For example, the
James court explained that while an attempted burglary could
potentially be perpetrated without creating a risk of injury to
anyone, the typical commission of the crime would create such a
risk." The Court pointed out that a person convicted of
attempted burglary is likely to have been caught in the act, and
that such a confrontation presents a serious risk that someone
will be injured.3 ' Thus, the Court concluded that attempted
burglary should be classified as a violent felony under the ACCA.
Additionally, James's analysis seems to have decreased the
amount of risk needed for a crime to qualify as a violent felony
under the ACCA. The Court rejected the argument that in order
to fall under the residual clause a crime must present "at least as
much risk as the least risky of the [statute's] enumerated
offenses." While the Court acknowledged that the crime in
question-attempted burglary-presents essentially the same
risk as the enumerated offense of burglary, its analysis indicates
that a crime that did not present the same risk would not
automatically fall outside the provision of the residual clause. 3
The Court noted that requiring a crime to involve "at least as
much risk" as the enumerated offenses would "greatly reduce[]
28 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
29 James, 550 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).
'0 See id.
" See id. at 203-04.
32 Id. at 209-10. The enumerated offenses are those crimes specifically listed in
the statute's residual clause: "burglary, arson, or extortion," and crimes "involv[ing]
use of explosives." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
33 James, 550 U.S. at 209-11.
1658 [Vol. 85:1653
IT'SNOTRAPE-RAPE
the reach of [the] ACCA."" The Court also pointed out that such
a requirement would not aid courts in determining whether
offenses not listed in the ACCA qualify as violent felonies under
its residual clause.3 5
Finally, it is useful to note that the James Court looked to
the United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") for
support in classifying attempted burglary as a violent felony.
The Court remarked upon the similarities between the
definitions of the Commission's Sentencing Guidelines' "crime of
violence" and the ACCA's "violent felony."3 6 It then commented
on the Commission's determination that " 'crime [s] of violence' for
the purpose of the Guidelines enhancement 'include the offenses
of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit
such offenses.' ""3 In looking to the Commission for support, the
Court acknowledged that while it was not bound by the
Commission's conclusion, the Commission "is better able than
any individual court to make an informed judgment about the
relation between a particular offense and the likelihood of
accompanying violence."
3. Begay v. United States
In 2008, the Supreme Court again refined the framework for
classification under the residual clause in Begay v. United
States.3 9 The Begay court determined whether driving under the
influence (DUI), which becomes a felony under New Mexico law
after the third conviction, could be classified as a violent felony
under the ACCA's residual clause.4 0
Most significantly, the Begay court narrowed the scope of the
residual clause, seeming to contradict its stated fear of
"reduc[ing] the reach of [the] ACCA."1 The Begay court declined
to classify the New Mexico DUI convictions law as violent
felonies, reasoning that DUI was too dissimilar from the
34 Id. at 209-10.
* Id. at 210.
6 See id. at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
* Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2 cmt. 1 (2006)).
38 Id. at 206-07 (quoting United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
'o Id. at 140.
41 James, 550 U.S. at 209-10.
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enumerated offenses in the statute to fall under the residual
clause. 42 The New Mexico statute made it a crime to "drive a
vehicle ... under the influence of intoxicating liquor."4 3  This
misdemeanor becomes a felony after three previous convictions
under the same statute.4
The Court held that a crime must be similar in kind as well
as in degree of risk posed to the enumerated offenses in order to
be classified as a violent felony.45 In so holding, the Court relied
on three characteristics common to the enumerated offenses and
lacking from DUI: "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." 6
The Begay court interpreted the residual clause as an attempt to
identify and punish career criminals "who might deliberately
point the gun and pull the trigger."47 In this respect, the court
reasoned that "[c]rimes committed in ... a purposeful, violent,
and aggressive manner are potentially more dangerous when
firearms are involved."48  Finally, the Court concluded that
crimes, such as DUI, that are not "committed intentionally" are
not predictive of future "armed career criminal behavior."4 9
4. Chambers v. United States
The Supreme Court's most recent return to violent felony
classification under the residual clause occurred in the 2009 case
of Chambers v. United States.o In Chambers, the Court
determined that the Illinois crime of failure to report for
confinement5 ' should not be classified as a violent felony under
the ACCA.52 The Court also revisited the categorical approach,
expanding the modified version of the approach where different
behaviors falling under the same criminal statute are treated as
42 Begay, 553 U.S. at 148.
a Id. at 141 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(A) (2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
" See id. at 140 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(G)-(J)).
4 Id. at 143.
46 Id. at 144-45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir.
2006) (McConnell, J., dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 146.
48 Id. at 145 (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., dissenting in part))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49 Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
s0 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
s" Felony failure to report occurs when "[a] person convicted of a
felony . .. knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic
imprisonment." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31-6(a) (West 2009).
12 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 123.
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separate crimes. 3 The Chambers court expanded on Begay's
"purposeful, violent, and aggressive" analysis by also applying a
statistical analysis of the likelihood that the crime in question
would be accompanied by violence."4
Chambers's main impact on interpretation of the residual
clause is its reworking of the categorical approach to
classification of violent felonies. The modified categorical
approach allows courts to look "beyond the mere fact of conviction
in a narrow range of cases."55 The Chambers court applied the
modified approach to separate behaviors described in an Illinois
escape and failure to report statute." In its analysis the Court
broke the statutory section into seven "phrases," and then sorted
these phrases into "at least two separate crimes."57 In this way
the Court was able to separate failure to report from other types
of escape described in the same statutory section."
The Chambers court went on to analyze failure to report
under the Begay standard of "purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct." 9  The Court initiated its analysis with a simple
application of Begay, stating, "the crime amounts to a form of
inaction, a far cry from ... purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct .... [An individual who fails to report would seem
unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his whereabouts by
simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful
conduct."60  From there, however, the Court turned to a
statistical analysis of the risk of violence associated with the
crime. The Court based its analysis on a Commission report on
escape crimes that "included calculation of the likelihood that
violence would accompany commission . .. or the offender's later
apprehension."6 1 Based on this report, the Court concluded that
failure to report presented "only a small risk of physical
violence," and fell outside the scope of the ACCA.62
6" Id. at 126-27.
54 Id. at 128-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
* Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
* Chambers, 550 U.S. at 126-27.
57 Id.
5 Id.
59 Id. at 128-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. at 129.
62 Id. at 130.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTORY
RAPE AS A VIOLENT FELONY
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the classification of
statutory rape as a violent felony for ACCA sentence enhancing
purposes. In this vacuum, circuit courts remain divided over
whether or not this crime qualifies as a predicate offense.
A. The Second Circuit
In United States v. Daye the Second Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals held that a Vermont statutory rape
crime fell under the ACCA's residual clause for classification as a
violent felony." In its decision, the Daye court first pointed out
that the crime would clearly constitute a violent felony pre-
Begay," before proceeding to its Begay analysis.
Daye determined that a conviction under a Vermont statute
for sexual assault of a minor was a "violent felony" conviction for
the purposes of ACCA sentence enhancement. 6 The Vermont
statute in question forbade "sexual act[s] with another person"
where the other person is "under the age of sixteen."67
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the trial
court in Daye applied a modified categorical approach to Daye's
sexual assault convictions.68  The District Court looked to the
facts of Daye's convictions and concluded that they qualified as
violent felonies based on the particular ages of his victims. 69 This
approach has been followed by district courts classifying
statutory rape convictions as violent crimes under other federal
sentence enhancing statutes.70  Following the Supreme Court's
6 571 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2009).
6 id. at 230-32.
6 Id. at 232.
6 Id. at 237.
67 Id. at 229-30 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (1986) (since
amended)). This statute also included exceptions where the parties were married
and the sexual acts were consensual. Id. Its amended version further exempts
consensual acts between a person nineteen years of age or younger and a minor who
is at least fifteen years of age. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c)(2) (West 2011).
* Daye, 571 F.3d at 228.
69 Id. Daye's three past convictions for sexual assault under the Vermont statute
involved children ranging from age six to age twelve. Id. at 227.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2005)
(applying a modified categorical approach to a Tennessee statutory rape law that
applied to sixteen and seventeen year old victims); United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d
21, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2001) (allowing a sentencing court to look to charging documents
1662 [Vol. 85:1653
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expansive application of the modified approach in Chambers, it
seems even more likely that a modified approach is suitable for
statutory rape classification. While not explicitly condemning
the District Court's approach-examining the actual ages of the
victims-the Second Circuit declined to go beyond a strict
categorical approach "look[ing] only to the fact of conviction and
the statutory definition of the prior offense.""
Before reaching its conclusion, the Circuit Court first
determined that Daye's conviction for sexual assault of a minor
would have qualified as a violent felony pre-Begay. The court
noted that a pre-Begay analysis would have turned simply on
whether the crime in question posed a risk of physical injury
similar to that posed by the statute's enumerated crimes. The
court pointed out that the minor victims in statutory rape cases
are generally "smaller, weaker, and less experienced" as well as
more "susceptible to . . . the coercive power" of the adult
perpetrator.73  The court therefore concluded that the risk of
physical injury in such crimes is "serious and foreseeable."" In
response to the argument that the crime only presents such a
risk of injury with particularly young victims,7 5 the court
countered that the Vermont statute in question only applies to
victims fifteen years of age and younger. The court further
noted that young teens may not be fully developed, thus facing a
risk of injury from the act of intercourse itself.7 7  Finally, the
court pointed out that the risk of injury to victims who are
"legally unable to consent" because of their physical or emotional
immaturity is not limited to risk stemming directly from the
sexual act." The risk involved also encompasses "a substantial
or jury instructions to determine the age of a Rhode Island statutory rape victim);
United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (supporting a
modified categorical approach that allowed consideration the victim's age under an
Illinois statutory rape law).
7n Daye, 571 F.3d at 229 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether the Circuit Court was
influenced by the facts of Daye's convictions is a possibility that should not be
ignored, but cannot be proved or disproved.
72 Id. at 230 (citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007)).
13 Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2007)).
74 Id.
76 This argument is based on the fact that the statute includes "consensual"
contact even where the victim cannot legally give consent.
76 Id.
7 Id.
78 Id. at 232.
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likelihood that the adult may employ force to coerce the child's
accession."" Consequently, the court held that the crime
involved a "serious potential risk" of injury."
Following its determination that the crime involved a risk of
injury comparable to the statute's enumerated offenses, the court
proceeded to undertake a Begay-based analysis."' In engaging in
its Begay analysis, the court first turned to precedent set by
Chery v. Ashcroft for guidance, which classified statutory rape as
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).8 2 Citing Chery, the
court noted that a sexual act with a minor, unlike drunk driving,
involves "affirmative conduct."83  Daye stated that statutory
rape "creates a risk, not generally present during the commission
of a drunk driving offense, that the perpetrator will intentionally
use force."84 Next, the court addressed the issue of mens rea.
Begay requires that a crime involve "purposeful" conduct,"
thus bringing into question whether a strict liability crime such
as statutory rape can qualify as a violent felony. Daye
acknowledged the strict liability nature of the crime, but pointed
out that despite this, it also involves "deliberate and affirmative
conduct-namely, an intentional sexual act" and therefore
satisfies the "purposeful" requirement of Begay."6 Finally, the
7 Id.
80 Id.
" See id.
82 347 F.3d 404, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2003). Chery held that a conviction under a
Connecticut statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a person between the ages of
thirteen and sixteen was a crime of violence. Id. The statute also provided that the
perpetrator must be more than three years older than the victim. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West 2011). In an interesting parallel, the Chery court
distinguished that case from Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 205-08 (2d. Cir.
2001), in which it held DUI not to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). See
Daye, 571 F.3d at 233. The ruling in Dalton was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Leocal v. Ashcroft, using similar reasoning to that found in Begay. See 543 U.S. 1,
10-11 (2004) (noting that DUI requires mere negligent misconduct, while crimes of
violence require a higher mens rea). In fact, Begay cites directly to Leocal in its
reasoning. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143, 145-46 (2008).
83 See Daye, 571 F.3d at 233. The court admits that precedent involving
classification under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not controlling, but finds Chery's analysis
persuasive as applicable to the ACCA's residual clause nonetheless. See id. at 233
n.9.
* Id. at 233.
85 See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144.
86 Daye, 571 F.3d at 234. The court again turned to precedent to establish the
affirmative nature of statutory rape as opposed to DUI, remarking that "engaging in
sexual intercourse with a minor . .. is a crime of violence as it 'involves affirmative
conduct' in the form of 'the deliberate touching of [the child's] intimate parts.' This
1664 [Vol. 85:1653
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court turned to the "violent" and "aggressive" requirements of
Begay." Reiterating its "substantial risk" arguments, the court
held that the use of force that is likely in statutory rape cases
"establishes that the perpetrator will commonly act in
a . . . violent[] and aggressive manner."" The court ultimately
held that statutory rape is at least as "intentionally aggressive
and violent" as the enumerated crime of burglary, and that it
therefore must be classified as a violent felony under the ACCA's
residual clause."
B. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits of the United
States Court of Appeals have each held statutory rape crimes not
to be violent felonies under the ACCA. The most recent case
supporting this holding was United States v. McDonald.90
McDonald's reasoning is representative of arguments made by
the circuits against the residual clause covering the crime of
statutory rape.
In McDonald, the Seventh Circuit held that a conviction
under section two of Wisconsin's Sexual Assault of a Child
statute did not qualify as a violent felony.91 Section two of the
statute prohibits sexual contact or intercourse with a person
under the age of sixteen.92 McDonald was convicted under this
statute for engaging in sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old
type of conduct creates a risk, not generally present during the commission of a
drunk driving offense, that the perpetrator will intentionally use force." Id. at 233
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Dos Santos v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d
81, 85 (2d Cir. 2006)).
" See id. at 234.
* Id.
8 Id. The court also muses that the typical instance of statutory rape is likely
more "violent and aggressive" than the typical instance of burglary, citing a 1985
case in which the Supreme Court looked at statistical evidence indicating that
burglaries were rarely violent. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1985)).
90 592 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010).
91 See id. at 815. The court was analyzing the applicability of McDonald's past
conviction to sentence enhancement under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2K2.1(a)(2). See id. at 809. Before beginning its analysis, the Seventh Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals pointed out that § 2K2.1(a) is virtually identical to
the ACCA's "violent felony" definition. Id. at 810. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit
had previously held that the two statutes should be "interpreted in the same way."
Id. For this reason, it is unnecessary to further address the fact that McDonald did
not actually involve classification under the ACCA.
92 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 948.02(2) (West 2011).
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girl." In its analysis, the court first discussed pre-Begay
precedent, and then determined that, under the categorical
approach, the age of the victim in McDonald's specific crime was
irrelevant.9 4 Following this determination, the court found that
the categorical crime did not involve "purposeful, violent, and
aggressive" behavior, as required by Begay."
McDonald's reasoning is preceded by a discussion of United
States v. Shannon, in which the Seventh Circuit held that a
conviction for statutory rape, under the same Wisconsin statute
in question in McDonald, did qualify as a crime of violence." In
this pre-Begay case, the court declined to hold that all convictions
under the statute qualified as crimes of violence, but that the
specific violation did qualify as such, due to the particularly
young age of the victim." The McDonald court identified two
immediate issues with applying Shannon's holding to McDonald:
1) the victim in McDonald was fifteen-the oldest age covered by
the statute-so, holding that McDonald's conviction was a crime
of violence would effectively make every conviction under the
statute a crime of violence;" and 2) the modified categorical
approach that was applied in Shannon would be inappropriate in
the post-Begay environment.99 The court viewed the statute as
indivisible with respect to the age of the victim, stating that "[it]
does not enumerate multiple categories of the offense, some of
which may be crimes of violence and others not."00
" McDonald, 592 F.3d at 813.
94 Id. The court reasoned that the modified categorical approach should not be
used because the statute was "not divisible as to the age of the victim." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
" See id. at 814-15.
* 110 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 1997).
" See id. at 387. Shannon's victim was only thirteen years of age. Id. at 384.
' See McDonald, 592 F.3d at 813. The problem with such a holding
would presumably be contradicting Shannon. This author finds this argument
unpersuasive given that any language in Shannon stating that crimes under the
Wisconsin statute were not crimes of violence is mere dicta.
9 Id. at 813 n.2. Chambers's influence on the categorical approach is not
discussed by the court.
1oo Id. at 814. This argument is not particularly persuasive given the previous
classification of the crime as a violent felony as perpetrated against a thirteen-year-
old victim in Shannon. See Shannon, 110 F.3d at 387.
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Following its discussion of Shannon, the court moved into its
Begay analysis. 101 The court first addressed Begay's "purposeful"
requirement. 102 The court reasoned that because statutory rape
is a strict liability crime, it could not be purposeful in the sense
required by Begay.os The court stated that Begay, through its
"purposeful" requirement, "removed strict-liability crimes from
the reach of the residual clause of the ACCA's definition of
violent felony." 0 4 Next, the court evaluated the requirement that
the crime involve "violent and aggressive" conduct.o" Here, the
court noted the circuit split on the issue, and remarked that it
would be "difficult to conclude that the offense is typically violent
and aggressive."0 6 Though the court expressed doubt that
statutory rape could "qualify as categorically 'violent and
aggressive,'" it relied on its determination that the "purposeful"
requirement was not met, and declined to make a further
determination as to the "violent and aggressive" requirement.0 "
Other courts have found that statutory rape does not involve
violent and aggressive conduct; the primary arguments are that
the conduct may be consensual 0 and "constructive force" implied
by inability to legally consent is not equivalent to "violent" or
"aggressive" conduct. 09  The first of these arguments is
101 See McDonald, 592 F.3d at 814.
102 Id.
103 See id. The court acknowledged that the act of the crime is indeed purposeful,
but reasoned that because there is no requirement that the perpetrator have any
intent as to the age of the victim-"the statutory element that makes thle] conduct
illegal"-any "purpose" involved is not of the kind required by Begay. Id.
10 Id.
105 Id.
10 Id. at 814-15.
10' See id. ("[Blecause the offense is not categorically 'purposeful' in the sense
required by Begay, we need not decide whether it is also categorically 'violent and
aggressive.' As a strict-liability offense, a conviction under § 948.02(2) does not
qualify as a crime of violence after Begay.").
108 See United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009)
("[Blecause statutory rape may involve consensual sexual intercourse, it does not
necessarily involve either 'violent' or 'aggressive' conduct." (citation omitted)). This
argument is unpersuasive given that Begay requires that we look to the typical
commission of the crime, not that every commission of the crime involve violent and
aggressive conduct.
10 See United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 448 (4th Cir. 2009). It is worth
noting that the Virginia statute under which Thornton was convicted of statutory
rape specifically applies only to non-forcible sexual acts. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
63 (West 2011).
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unpersuasive given that Begay requires evaluation based on the
typical commission of the crime, not that every commission of the
crime involve violent and aggressive conduct. 10
III. ANALYSIS
Given the confused state of the law surrounding application
of the ACCA's residual clause, and the wide variation in ages of
consent in statutory rape laws from state to state, it is no wonder
that there is no consensus among the circuits on the
classification of statutory rape. It is also apparent that strict
application of the law as it has evolved may not always serve
the purposes of the ACCA. This Part will analyze the
classification of statutory rape as a violent felony under the
ACCA by applying existing precedent. It will illustrate how the
categorical approach to violent felony classification will lead to
conflicting classifications of the same criminal behaviors because
of the differences between state statutory rape crimes. Next, it
will address how applying a modified categorical approach to
statutory rape convictions would best serve the purposes of the
ACCA. Finally, this Part will address the policy interests
surrounding the classification of statutory rape as a violent
felony and argue that allowing judges to look to the age of
statutory rape victims in applying the ACCA will protect the
policy interests of both victims and offenders.
A. Categorically Applying Begay to the Uncategorized Crime of
Statutory Rape
The four circuit cases in which Begay has been applied to
statutory rape crimes are illustrative of the problems involved in
reaching a unified categorical classification of the crime under
the ACCA. First, the categorical approach itself is in a
confused state following the Supreme Court's most recent
residual clause decisions. Furthermore, the immense variation
between statutory rape laws makes it likely that states will reach
inconsistent results in classifying identical criminal behaviors.
This inconsistency could be avoided by allowing judges to look to
the age of the statutory rape victim in determining whether or
not the conviction should be classified as a violent felony.
110 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008).
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1. Defining the Typical Commission of the Crime
The categorical approach requires that a violent felony
analysis be applied to the crime as it is ordinarily committed."'
Under the unmodified categorical approach, the ordinary or
typical instance of the crime is based on its statutory elements
alone."2 After Chambers v. United States, it appears that in
applying the categorical approach, the first question is how the
particular crime committed by the defendant should be
characterized within its statute."3 If the statutory crime in
question could be interpreted to involve multiple types of
behavior, the modified categorical approach is applied, and the
particular act of the defendant must be placed into a categorical
group of behavior contained within the statute.114  This
behavioral group must then be analyzed to determine whether it
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.1'5
In determining how statutory rape convictions should be
categorized, it is important to address the variety in state laws
regarding such crimes. Statutory rape is generally characterized
by sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent.
State statutes differ in two main regards: ages of consent and age
gap provisions. Age of consent refers to the age below which a
child is considered unable to consent to sexual contact by the
governing statute."' In 1999, ages of consent in the fifty states
ranged from fourteen to eighteen.1' 7  Age gap provisions
safeguard young people who engage in sexual relationships with
partners relatively close to their own ages. These provisions
work by decriminalizing sexual activity with a person under the
n.. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 194 (2007).
H2 See, e.g., Begay, 553 U.S. at 141 ("In determining whether this crime is a
violent felony ... we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense... .").
n1 See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009) ("This categorical
approach requires courts to choose the right category. And sometimes the choice is
not obvious. The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statutory phrase
matters in this respect.").
n1 See id. at 126-27. (dissecting the statute in question by organizing it into
three groups of separate types of behaviors). If this sounds confusing, it is because it
is. No court has attempted to use this approach to break non-segregated statutory
rape crimes into behavior groups based on the ages of the victims.
n. See id. at 127.
116 CAROLYN COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (2004).
11 See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (showing a breakdown of statutory ages of consent and
age gap provisions of state laws).
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age of consent where the age difference between the parties
involved is less than a defined number of years. In 1999,
statutory age gaps varied from two to six years and had been
adopted by forty-two of the fifty states. 18
Further distinctions between state statutory rape laws occur
on two other main points. First, some state laws apply only to
nonforcible, or purportedly consensual, contact,"' while others-
the majority, in fact-do not distinguish on the basis of force.12 0
Second, some state statutes are organized to create separate
graduated crimes based on the age of the victim,'"' while others
apply simply to every person below a certain age.'22
Given these differences, it is easy to see how two separate
statutory rape laws would be analyzed differently under the
categorical approach. For instance, statutes that grade offenses
based on the age of the victim would be subjected to a modified
categorical approach.'2 3 It is also possible that convictions based
on statutes that do not graduate crimes on the basis of age may
get pigeonholed with a particular classification based on the facts
of the first conviction evaluated under the ACCA.'2 4 After
Chambers, however, it could be argued that all statutory rape
laws should be subjected to a modified categorical approach on
the basis of age, by reading the statutes as governing several
distinct types of behavior.'2 5 The trial court in Daye applied this
approach, looking to the age of the victims to determine whether
Daye's statutory rape convictions should be classified as crimes
of violence.' 26 Courts have applied a similar approach to
classification of statutory rape under sentence-enhancing
n See, e.g., id.
n1 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (West 2011).
120 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(3) (West 2011); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.02(2) (West 2011).
121 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.032 (West 2011) (criminalizing sexual
intercourse with a person under the age of fourteen, with a provision increasing
sentencing for engaging in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of twelve).
122 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37-6 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
655 (2010).
123 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
124 While the categorical approach requires judges to only look to the fact of
conviction, it seems logical to assume that they may be swayed to fit a square peg
into a round hole if particularly moved by the facts of past convictions.
125 See generally Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125-27 (2009).
126 United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir. 2009).
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statutes other than the ACCA.127 The most basic of statutory
rape laws would not be likely to attract a modified categorical
approach because, at least superficially, they describe one type of
behavior-sexual contact with a person under the age of consent.
Barring application of the modified categorical approach, the
typical instance of the crime would generally involve sexual
activity, whether forcible or not, with a person under the age of
consent, with no consideration given as to the specific age of the
victim.
2. Applying Begay to the Typical Instance of the Crime
The various differences between statutory rape laws make it
unlikely that Begay could be applied uniformly across the United
States to convictions with identical underlying behavior.
Statutes that indicate ages of consent on the lower end of the
spectrum are more likely to be classified as violent felonies than
those with ages of consent on the upper end of the spectrum. 128
Additionally, statutes that have an absence of force as an
element of the crime will be less likely to be classified as violent
felonies. 2 9 Following the Supreme Court's example in Chambers,
however, by evaluating a statistical analysis that describes the
various circumstances surrounding its perpetration,13 0 a more
accurate picture can be obtained of how the typical instance of
the crime is committed.
In 2005, The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention published a statistical analysis of statutory rape
incidents.' The data shows that the majority of victims were
1I See, e.g., United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2005)
(applying a modified categorical approach to a Tennessee statutory rape law that
applied to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old victims); United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d
21, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (allowing a sentencing court to look to charging documents or
jury instructions to determine the age of a Rhode Island statutory rape victim);
United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 298-300 (7th Cir. 1998) (supporting a
modified categorical approach that allowed consideration of the victim's age under
an Illinois statutory rape law).
128 Cf United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 813-15 (7th Cir. 2010)
(discussing precedent that held the statutory rape of thirteen-year-old victim to
qualify as a crime of violence but declining to similarly qualify the same crime as
committed against a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old victim).
129 Cf United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 446-49 (4th Cir. 2009).
130 See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126-27 (2009).
131 Karyl Troup-Leasure & Howard N. Snyder, Statutory Rape Known to Law
Enforcement, JUV. JUST. BULL., Aug. 2005, at 1. The analysis is based on the FBI's
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either fourteen or fifteen years old, with perpetrators generally
being six years older than their victims. 132  The probability of
arrest, however, and therefore of conviction, increased
significantly as the age of the victim decreased. 3 3 Furthermore,
the probability of arrest also increased significantly as the age of
the perpetrator increased.134  Therefore, the majority of
convictions likely involved relatively young victims and relatively
old perpetrators. Finally, the great majority of statutory rape
crimes are committed by adult males against juvenile females.13 5
This is relevant given that self-reporting indicates that
relationships between adult males and adolescent girls often
involve violence.136
Applying these statistics, it appears that the typical instance
of statutory rape, where the victim is at the lower end of the age
spectrum, involves at least a significant risk of violent or
aggressive conduct, as required by Begay. The only remaining
consideration then is whether the crime involves the type of
purposeful conduct required by Begay.
The strict liability nature of statutory rape crimes
complicates the analysis of whether these crimes involve the type
of purposeful conduct required by Begay. The physical act
involved in the crime is almost certainly undertaken
intentionally; however, there is no requirement for intent as to
National Incident-Based Reporting System reports, which contain data from twenty-
one states for the years 1996 to 2000. Id.
132 Id. The six-year median age difference applies to female victims and male
offenders. Id. The median age difference between female offenders with male victims
was nine years. Id. Most statutory rapes-ninety-nine percent of those with female
victims and ninety-four percent of those with male victims-were heteronormative.
Id.
133 See id. at 4. Only thirty percent of incidents involving victims seventeen
years of age led to an arrest, while fifty percent of incidents involving twelve-year-
old victims led to an arrest. Id.
I See id. Where offenders were between the ages of twelve and fourteen,
arrests occurred in only twenty-eight percent of incidents, while incidents involving
offenders thirty-five and older involved an arrest forty-six percent of the time. Id.
Also, adult arrests cleared thirty-six percent of cases, while juvenile arrests cleared
only six percent. Id.
13 See id. at 1. Ninety-five percent of victims are female, and ninety-nine
percent of female victim offenders are male. Id.
136 See Denise A. Hines & David Finkelhor, Statutory Sex Crime Relationships
Between Juveniles and Adults: A Review of Social Scientific Research, 12
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 300, 307 (2007) ("These girls had relationships in
which they were physically abused, controlled, and manipulated ... by their adult
male boyfriends. . . .").
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the age of the victim.' 3 7 As pointed out by the Seventh Circuit in
McDonald, the age of the victim is precisely what makes the act
illegal. 138
If Begay is read to automatically disqualify strict liability
crimes, statutory rape cannot be classified as a violent felony,
regardless of the level of violence or risk of injury involved in the
typical offense. Some support for this interpretation can be
garnered from dicta in Begay. The Begay court initiated its
analysis of DUI crimes by stating that "statutes that forbid
driving under the influence ... do not insist on purposeful,
violent, and aggressive conduct; rather, they are, or are
most nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict
liability ... in ... which the offender need not have had any
criminal intent at all."39 As a counterpoint to this argument,
however, Begay reached its "purposeful" requirement by looking
at elements common to crimes enumerated in the ACCA's
residual clause, 14 0 not all of which require an element of intent.
The residual clause enumerates "crimes involving explosives,"'
which would include crimes with a mens rea of negligence and
recklessness.142
The Second Circuit's argument in Daye is persuasive. The
Second Circuit reasoned that engaging in a sexual act with a
minor involves "deliberate and affirmative conduct." 4 3 The crime
committed by a perpetrator of statutory rape is intentional-
strict liability merely removes the defense of mistake of fact as to
the victim's age. The unavailability of the mistake of age defense
seems less relevant when the victim is particularly young, or the
age difference between the victim and perpetrator is particularly
large. At least one of these factors is present in the large
majority of statutory rape convictions,'" and therefore in the
typical commission of the crime for the purpose of analysis under
1' Some states do allow reasonable mistake of age as a defense to the crime. 6
AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 63 (2010). Statutes allowing for this defense would
presumably be easy to classify as involving the type of purposeful behavior required
by Begay.
138 See United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2010).
139 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008).
140 See id. at 144-45.
141 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
141 See Begay, 553 U.S. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14 United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2009); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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the ACCA. Furthermore, approximately twenty-five percent of
states in the nation provide a mistake of age defense to statutory
rape defendants. 145
B. Meeting the Purpose of the ACCA
The purpose of the ACCA is clear-punishing recidivist
criminals and incapacitating the most dangerous offenders.146 A
second purpose, implied by the first, is to protect potential
victims of violent crimes. In serving this purpose with respect to
statutory rape, statistics profiling offenders are a useful tool.
Unfortunately, there are few studies evaluating statutory rape
offender statistics. 4 7
The few studies that have been performed tend to show
that many statutory rape offenders already have criminal
backgrounds. 4 8  Studies characterizing the fathers of children
born to adolescent mothers indicate that older men who seek out
adolescent females for relationships are more likely to have prior
criminal histories.149 Fifty-six percent of persons imprisoned for
statutory rape have prior criminal convictions, with thirty-one
percent having prior convictions for violent crimes. 5 0
Additionally, persons imprisoned for statutory rape are more
likely to have past convictions for rape or sexual assault than
other sex crime prisoners.' 5'
The high rate of prior violent convictions for statutory rape
offenders1 5 2 makes it likely that they are the types of career
offenders the ACCA was designed to target. Further data may be
needed regarding recidivism among statutory rape offenders,
'" See Age of Consent Chart for the U.S., http://www.ageofconsent.us (2012).
146 See 134 CONG. REC. 88493-03 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter).
14 See Hines & Finkelhor, supra note 136, at 308.
t4 See id.; see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ-
163392, SEx OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT 22-23 (1997).
149 See Hines & Finkelhor, supra note 136, at 308.
150 GREENFELD, supra note 147, at 22. Additionally, while those imprisoned for
forcible rape were slightly more likely to have any prior convictions, those
imprisoned for statutory rape were slightly more likely to have prior convictions for
violent crimes. See id. What crimes are considered violent for the purpose of this
data set is not defined. See id.
151 Id. Twenty-six percent of those imprisoned for statutory rape had prior
convictions for rape or sexual assault, while only ten percent of those imprisoned for
forcible rape had similar prior convictions. Id.
152 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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however, in order to confirm this conclusion.'13 Furthermore, the
statistics in question apply only to those offenders who were
sentenced to prison.154 The ACCA makes no distinction between
criminals convicted of the same crimes and given different
sentences. '"
C. Policy Concerns
The two groups that would be most affected by the
classification of statutory rape as a violent felony are its victims
and perpetrators. While there is a strong interest in protecting
potential victims, offenders should also be protected from
undeservedly long sentences.
The interests of potential statutory rape victims would be
best served by providing long sentences to offenders, particularly
when those offenders show a trend of repeat violent offenses.'5 6
Research on the effect of statutory rape on victims of the crime
shows that even victims who claim that their sexual encounters
were consensual may present negative or neutral responses to
their statutory relationships."' Additionally, regardless of issues
involving consent, statutory relationships present relatively high
risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.' 8
11 The data does not indicate imprisoned statutory rape offenders' specific past
convictions, nor does it indicate their likelihood of re-arrest after release. In general,
rape and sexual assault offenders tend to have lower general re-arrest rates than
other violent offenders, but a higher re-arrest rate for sexually based offenses. See
GREENFELD, supra note 147, at 26-27.
'" See id. at 25-26 (providing statistics for incarcerated offenders).
15 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). To be a violent felony, the crime must be
punishable by at least one year in prison, the offender need not have received a
prison sentence, however. Id.
I" The probability of repeat violent offenses is indicated by the large number of
statutory rape offenders with prior violent crime convictions. See GREENFELD, supra
note 147, at 22. Additionally, those imprisoned for sexually based offenses are far
more likely than other violent criminals to have prior sexual offense convictions and
be arrested for sexual offenses after release. See id. at 23, 26-27.
'7 See Irma T. Elo et al., Adolescent Females: Their Sexual Partners and the
Fathers of Their Children, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 74, 81 (1999) ("[Wlomen who
experienced first intercourse at a young age or whose first partner was older were
more likely to report a lower score on the wantedness scale than women who
initiated sexual activity in their late teens or early 20s or whose partners were close
to their own age."). Statutory relationships are sexual relationships between adults
and minors under the legal age of consent.
" See Hines & Finkelhor, supra note 136 ("[Aldolescent girls who have older
partners begin having sex earlier than their counterparts and have riskier sex in
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Young adolescents who engage in voluntary sexual
relationships with older partners may not actually be in a
position to give meaningful consent.15 9 Young teens are unlikely
to know the pregnancy and other risks involved in sexual
contact. 160 Additionally, adolescents may be particularly
susceptible to manipulation and coercion by their adult partners,
leading to a false perception by the younger partners that it was
their uncompelled decision to engage in sexual conduct.16 This is
supported by evidence that adolescent participants in "voluntary"
sexual relationships with older partners are more likely than
those with partners close to their own ages to rank their desire
for the sexual contact low on a "wantedness scale" despite the
purportedly consensual nature of the relationship.162
In addition to issues of meaningful consent, adolescents who
engage in sexual relationships with adult partners face serious
health, social, and psychological risks. 6 3  Adolescent females
involved in relationships with adult males are more likely to
contract sexually transmitted diseases or become pregnant.1 6 4
The younger the female at the time of the statutory relationship,
the more likely that she will attempt suicide or engage in other
self-destructive behaviors.'6  Even male victims of statutory rape
by adult females, who predominantly report their statutory
relationships as being positive experiences, show "slightly more
psychological, alcohol, and deliberate self-harming behavior
problems than men without such experiences. "166
While protecting adolescents from adult sexual predators is
an important policy goal, perhaps equally important is the
protection of non-predatory statutory rape offenders from
that they do not consistently use a condom, are more likely to contract HIV or
another sexually transmitted disease, and are more likely to get pregnant).
.' See id. at 309 ("[O]nly a small minority of younger adolescents have the
knowledge that is necessary to make informed decisions regarding sexual behavior,
particularly sexual relationships with adults.").
160 See id. ("In one national survey, 13-year-olds did not know the most effective
pregnancy prevention method, and only 10% of girls and 7% of boys understood the
female fertility cycle and its effects on the likelihood of getting pregnant.").
161 See id. at 310 (describing the "grooming process" researchers have argued
occurs in statutory relationships).
162 See Elo et al., supra note 156.
'6 See Hines & Finkelhor, supra note 136, at 306-08.
'" See id. at 307.
165 See id. at 306.
166 Id. at 308.
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undeservedly long sentences. While statistics indicate that the
majority of statutory rape convictions involve particularly young
victims with significantly older partners, 167 there are cases in
which closely aged partners of adolescents are convicted
following consensual sexual relationships. es
Those involved in consensual relationships are less likely to
be arrested for, and therefore convicted of, statutory rape.6 9
Additionally, to face ACCA sentence enhancement, a defendant
must have had three prior violent felony convictions.170 These
two facts may be enough to protect defendants convicted of
statutory rape on the basis of consensual relationships. Allowing
judges to look to the ages of victims and offenders, however,
would provide additional assurance that defendants would not
receive unwarranted sentence enhancements.
The above analysis indicates that a felony conviction for
statutory rape, coupled with two other violent felony convictions,
would be a good indicator that a defendant is the type of career
criminal targeted by the ACCA. Additionally, strong policy
interests-protection of adolescents from sexually transmitted
diseases, pregnancy, and other negative effects associated with
engaging in statutory relationships-favor prevention of
statutory rape, and therefore the incapacitation of offenders with
long criminal histories including statutory rape. Furthermore, it
is likely that most convictions for statutory rape occur in
conditions that indicate a high risk of violent and aggressive
behavior. Given the strict liability nature of statutory rape laws,
and the inability of judges to distinguish convictions based on
victims' ages when applying the categorical approach, it is
unlikely that many courts will classify it as a violent felony."7
This result seems incongruous in light of the dangerous nature of
the crime, especially as committed against particularly young
victims.
1 See Troup-Leasure & Snyder, supra note 131, at 3.
6 See, e.g., COCCA, supra note 117, at 125 (recounting the case of an eighteen-
year-old convicted of statutory rape for having a sexual relationship with his fifteen-
year-old fiancee).
169 See Troup-Leasure & Snyder, supra note 131, at 4 ("The probability of arrest
was related to the victim-offender relationship. Persons coded as boyfriends and
girlfriends were the least likely to be arrested.")
170 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
171 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008).
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The categorical approach, while encouraging uniform
application, has become overly complex17 2 and does not best serve
the purpose of the statute. 7 s Several courts have applied a
modified categorical approach to statutory rape classification
under other federal sentence enhancing statutes. 7 4 These courts
look at the age of the victim as a factor for determining whether
the conviction should be a predicate crime for sentence
enhancement.1 75
This Note recommends an approach that allows classification
of statutory rape as a violent felony in circumstances where it
carries a high risk of violence. The best way to accomplish this
goal would be to allow judges to apply a modified categorical
approach. The two factors that best predict whether a statutory
rape offender is the type of criminal the ACCA is meant to target
are sentencing and the relative and actual ages of the offender
and his or her victim at the time of the offense. While courts
have not previously looked at past sentences to determine
whether convictions should be classified as violent felonies, as
discussed above, they have looked at victim's ages in making
such determinations. Age alone may be a sufficient factor for
classifying a statutory rape conviction as a violent felony, given
the correlation between harsh sentencing and younger victims.'
Allowing courts to look to statutory rape victims' ages when
applying the ACCA would require only a very limited fact finding
172 See April K. Whitescarver, Chambers v. United States: Filling in the Gaps
When Interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act, 13 JONES L. REv. 89, 105-06
(2009).
173 For instance, restricting courts to viewing only the elements of the statute
under which the defendant was convicted, or alternatively the typical instance of the
crime, prevents courts from enhancing the sentences of defendants who commit
typically non-violent crimes in particularly violent manners.
174 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 740, 742 (6th Cir. 2005)
(applying a modified categorical approach to a Tennessee statutory rape law that
applied to 16 and 17 year old victims); United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 23 (1st
Cir. 2001) (allowing a sentencing court to look to charging documents or jury
instructions to determine the age of a Rhode Island statutory rape victim); United
States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1998) (supporting a modified
categorical approach that allowed consideration of the victim's age under an Illinois
statutory rape law).
" See Sawyers, 409 F.3d at 740-42; Sacko, 247 F.3d at 23-24; Thomas, 159
F.3d at 298-300.
176 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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effort, while both significantly furthering the purpose of the
statute and protecting those statutory rape offenders whose
crimes should not be classified as violent felonies.
The federal statutory rape law could provide a guideline for
determining which previous statutory rape convictions warrant
sentence enhancement under the ACCA. This law sets the age of
consent at sixteen, and has a four year age gap provision."
Using these criteria, judges evaluating past convictions could
look to charging instruments, guilty pleas, or findings of fact, and
apply sentence enhancement in cases where the victim was
under the age of sixteen and at least four years younger than the
perpetrator.
Consider this hypothetical: John was convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
The government is seeking to enhance his sentence under the
ACCA based on three prior convictions: two for burglary and one
for statutory rape. John's burglary convictions are enumerated
crimes under the ACCA, 7 8 so his sentence enhancement hinges
on the statutory rape conviction. John plead guilty to statutory
rape under an Idaho law that prohibits sexual intercourse
between a man eighteen or older and a female under the age of
sixteen after he was arrested for having a sexual relationship
with a fifteen-year-old girl."' John was eighteen years old at the
time. Applying this Note's recommendation, the sentencing
judge would look John's guilty plea and find that his conviction
does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Even
though John's victim was under the age of sixteen, he was not
four or more years older than her, as would be required by the
17' 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2006 & Supp. I). This law applies "in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or
in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by
direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal
department or agency."Id.
178 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
179 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101 (West 2011). Most rape statutes no longer make
distinctions based on gender. See COCCA, supra note 116, at 73-74. However, Idaho
defines rape as "penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening
with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female," when at least one of eight
listed circumstances apply. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101. Two of these listed
circumstances describe statutory rape crimes; one with an age of consent of sixteen
and a two year age gap provision, and one with an age of consent of eighteen and a
three year age gap provision. Id.
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Federal statutory rape law. Alternatively, under the same
approach, John's crime would qualify as a violent felony had his
victim been only thirteen or fourteen years old.
CONCLUSION
The ACCA attempts to incapacitate violent career criminals
by requiring mandatory minimum sentences for offenders with
three prior violent felony convictions. The categorical approach
to violent felony classification requires that courts base their
determinations on the typical instance of a crime, rather than on
the facts behind the prior convictions. Alternatively, a modified
categorical approach allows courts to look beyond the fact of
conviction when different behaviors are criminalized under the
same statute.
The differences between statutory rape laws, and the range
of behaviors to which they can be applied have led to inconsistent
holdings on whether or not they qualify as violent felonies for the
purpose of ACCA sentence enhancement. Such inconsistencies
likely result in undeservedly long sentences for some offenders
and failure to punish others who the ACCA attempts to target.
By applying a modified categorical approach, judges can
more accurately determine which past statutory rape convictions
warrant ACCA sentence enhancement. Looking to both the
victim's age and the age difference between the victim and
defendant provides a realistic method of determining whether
the conviction should constitute a violent felony for sentence
enhancement purposes. This method also resolves the unequal
application of the law that results from categorical classification
of the crime.
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